

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 VIENNA 03027 01 OF 03 042152Z

70

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 AEC-11 IO-14 OIC-04

OMB-01 DRC-01 /161 W

----- 089347

R 041851Z APR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2330

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 VIENNA 3027

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: BULGARIAN

STATEMENT AT PLENARY ON APRIL 4, 1974

SUMMARY. TONE OF APRIL 4 PLENARY PRESENTATION BY BULGARIAN REP WAS RELATIVELY MILD, BUT CONTAINED NOTHING NEW. SPEAKING FOR A FLANK COUNTRY, HE STRESSED THAT NEGOTIATIONS HAVE TO STRNGTHEN AND NOT DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS REGARDLESS OF THEIR STATUS. BULGARIAN REP, IN HIS STATEMENT, STRICTLY ADHERED TO ESTABLISHED WARSAW PACT PARTY-LINE EMPHASIZING THAT ALL FORCES, THAT IS, GROUND, AIR, AND NUCLEAR CAPABLE UNITS, WOULD HAVE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 VIENNA 03027 01 OF 03 042152Z

BE REDUCED. DICHEV QUOTED LIBERALLY FROM ASSERTIONS BY

US SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SCHLESINGER AND UK AND FRG LEADERS THAT THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE SHOULD NOT BE CHANGED. STATEMENT ALSO ADDRESSED NATO PLANS FOR MODERNIZATION OF FORCES AND SAID NATO CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IN MILITARY JOBS SHOULD BE COUNTED AS SOLDIERS. DICHEV CONCLUDED BY STRESSING THAT THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF DISPARITY OF GROUND FORCES IS UNFOUNDED AND CANNOT BECOME THE BASIS OF FUTURE REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS. THE FULL TEXT OF DICHEV'S SPEECH FOLLOWS. END SUMMARY.

BEGIN TEXT.

1. THE SECOND ROUND OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS ON MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE WILL SOON HAVE BEEN COMPLETED. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT OUR WORK HAS NOT BEEN SIMPLE, FIRST OF ALL BECAUSE THE QUESTIONS DISCUSSED AT THIS TABLE ARE VERY COMPLEX. THEY TOUCH UPON THE VITAL INTERESTS OF THE SECURITY OF THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME THE BULGARIAN DELEGATION WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THE BUSINESSLIKE AND SERIOUS CHARACTER OF THE DISCUSSIONS ON THE BASIC QUESTIONS OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS. THAT ALONE PROVIDES SOME BASIS TO HOPE THAT WITH GOODWILL AND DESIRE IT IS POSSIBLE TO REACH CONCRETE PRACTICAL RESULTS. NEVERTHELESS WE DO NOT CLOSE OUR EYES TO THE FACT THAT THE DIFFERENCE IN THE APPROACH OF BOTH SIDES TO THE QUESTION OF HOW TO PROCEED TO THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE REMAINS QUITE SUBSTANTIAL. ONLY A REALISTIC EVALUATION OF THE SITUATION IN EUROPE AND A DESIRE FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE DECISIONS CAN HELP FURTHER FORWARD MOVEMENT IN OUR RENEgotiations.

2. THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF RECENT YEARS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPING IN CONDITIONS OF THE PURSUIT BY MANY STATES OF A POLICY OF DETENTE NOT ONLY IN EUROPE, BUT IN THE WHOLE WORLD. IT IS PRECISELY THIS WHICH MADE POSSIBLE THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA, THE SUCCESS OF WHICH WOULD NECESSARILY BE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE CAUSE OF SUPPLEMENTING POLITICAL DETENTE WITH MILITARY DETENTE, AND TO THE CAUSE OF STRENGTHENING SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 VIENNA 03027 01 OF 03 042152Z

3. THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS IS THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF ANY OF THE SIDES. WE NOTE WITH SATISFACTION THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE CURRENT SESSION OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS THIS PRINCIPLE HAS BEEN CONFIRMED IN THE STATEMENTS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BOTH ON THE WESTERN SIDE AND ON THE EASTERN SIDE. FOR EXAMPLE, IN HIS STATEMENT OF 21 FEBRUARY OF THIS YEAR THE RESPECTED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FRG, AMBASSADOR BEHRENDs, STATED THAT "EVERYONE PRESENT IN THIS HALL

RECOGNISES THAT SECURITY IS EQUALLY IMPORTANT FOR ALL THE REGIONS OF EUROPE, AND THAT LASTING PEACE CANNOT BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT A HIGH DEGREE OF SECURITY...".

4. THE BULGARIAN DELEGATION, REPRESENTING A FLANK COUNTRY, ATTENTIVELY FOLLOWS THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WE CONSIDER MUST STRENGTHEN, AND NOT DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS REGARDLESS OF THEIR STATUS. THAT WHICH OCCURS IN ONE REGION OF EUROPE AFFECTS THE INTERESTS OF ANOTHER TO SOME DEGREE OR ANOTHER.

5. AT THE SAME TIME, BULGARIA, AS A SOCIALIST COUNTRY, CONNECTED BY LINKS OF FRIENDSHIP AND CLOSE FRATERNAL RELATIONS WITH OTHER SOCIALIST STATES, IS STRENGTHENING ITS SECURITY IN CLOSE CO-ORDINATION WITH OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES OF EUROPE IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE WARSAW PACT. SUCH IS THE POLITICAL REALITY. THAT IS WHY, ALTHOUGH WE ARE NOT AMONG THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, WE NEVERTHELESS CONTINUALLY KEEP OUR FINGER ON THE PULSE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS, STRIVING TO MAKE ANY CONTRIBUTION WE CAN TO THEIR SUCCESSFUL CONDUCT AND CONCLUSION.

6. LIKE ALL THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE BULGARIAN DELEGATION HAS OBVIOUSLY ANALYSED THE SITUATION WHICH IS TAKING SHAPE IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS OF THE EVE OF THE IMPENDING RECESS.

7. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE PRESENTED THEIR PLAN OF

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 VIENNA 03027 02 OF 03 042127Z

70  
ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 AEC-11 IO-14 OIC-04

OMB-01 DRC-01 /161 W  
----- 088935

R 041851Z APR 74  
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2331

SECDEF WASHDC  
INFO USMISSION NATO  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LOND  
USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 3 VIENNA 3027

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

REDUCTION AND IN OUR FIRM CONVICTION, CONVINCINGLY SHOWED THAT IT RESPONDS TO OUR MAIN GOAL - TO CONDUCT THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS WITH UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF ANY OF THE SIDES. IT REALISTICALLY TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES WHICH HAS DEVELOPED IN EUROPE AND IS AIMED IN SUCH A WAY THAT NO ONE WOULD RECEIVE UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES AS A RESULT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND SO THAT IT WOULD PROVIDE A REALISTIC BASIS FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE DECISIONS. IT PROPERLY TAKES INTO ACCOUNT ALL ELEMENTS COMPRISING THE COMPLEX OF THE GENERAL BALANCE OF ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE AND OPENS A REALISTIC PATH TO THE STRENGTHENING OF CONFIDENCE, SECURITY AND PEACE FOR ALL THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE.

8. BUT WHAT DO THE WESTERN COUNTRIES PROPOSE TO US? THEIR  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 VIENNA 03027 02 OF 03 042127Z

PLAN, TABLED ON 22 NOVEMBER 1973, AND ALSO SUBSEQUENT EXPLANATIONS LEAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE NATO STATES DESIRE TO GAIN FOR THEMSELVES, AS A RESULT OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS, UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES AT THE EXPENSE OF THE WEAKENING OF THE SECURITY OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.

9. THE DELEGATIONS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES HAVE REPEATEDLY STRESSED THAT THEIR PLAN OF REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS BASED ON A CONCEPT OF ELIMINATING DISPARITIES SAID TO EXIST BETWEEN THE GROUND TROOPS OF THE NATO COUNTRIES AND THE WARSAW PACT LOCATED IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IN THEIR STATEMENT THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS HAVE REPEATEDLY INDICATED THAT THE SUPERIORITY OF THE STATES OF THE WARSAW PACT IN THE NUMBERS OF GROUND TROOPS AND TANKS CAUSES CONCERN IN THE WEST AND THAT IT IS ALLEGEDLY THE BASIS OF INSTABILITY IN EUROPE. THEY DECLARE TO US THAT THE AIM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS CONSISTS OF REMOVING THE INDICATED DISPARITY BY MEANS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMON CEILINGS ON THE MANPOWER OF GROUND TROOPS OF BOTH SIDES.

10. THE CONCEPT OF DISPARITY IN THE SIZES OF THE GROUND TROOPS

OF THE NATO AND WARSAW PACE COUNTRIES IS THEREFORE, IN THE CONVICTION OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE CONERSTONE OF THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES AND OF THEIR PLAN OF REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

11. THE BULGARIAN DELEGATION IS CONVINCED THAT THIS CONCEPT CAN-NOT SERVE AS A BASIS FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE PROBLEM OF REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

12. IF ONE EVALUATES THE MODERN ARMED FORCES OF STATES, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHICH ARE HIGHY DEVELOPED IN THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL SENSE, IT IS OBVIOUS, - AND THIS IS RECOGNISED BY MILITARY SPECIALISTS, - THAT SUCH AN EVALUATION OF THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF A MODERN ARMY IS ACCOMPLISHED ON THE BASIS OF THE AGREGATE OF ALL ELEMENTS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. THE ACTION OF MODERN ARMED FORCES IS INCONCEIVABLE WITHOUT CLOSE INTER-ACTION OF ALL ELEMENTS SUCH AS: THAT OF GROUND TROOPS WITH ALL ARMS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT, AIR FORCES, AND UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NATURALLY, IN THOSE ARMIES WHICH POSSESS SUCH WEAPONS). MILITARY EXPERIENCE IN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 VIENNA 03027 02 OF 03 042127Z

RECENT YEARS SHOWS THAT ATTEMPTS TO EXAGGERATE THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL TYPES OF ARMED FORCES ARE BASELESS. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE, FOR EXAMPLE, TO EXPECT AT THE PRESENT TIME EFFECTIVE USE OF GROUND TROOPS WITHOUT THE SUPPORT OF AVIATION. FURTHERMORE, UNDER PARTICULAR CONDIDTIONS THE ROLE OF THE AIR FORCES CAN NOTABLY INCREASE AND EVEN ACQUIRE A PREDOMINAT CHARACTER. THE EXPERIENCE OF MILITARY ACTIONS, PARTICULARLY RECENTLY, SHOWS THAT THE EXAGGERATION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF ONE OR ANOTHER TYPE OF WEAPON AMONG GROUND TROOPS LEADS TO UNFORTUNATE CONSEQUENCES, SINCE ONLY BY USING ALL TYPES OF WEAPONS CAN ARMED FORCES EFFECTIVELY FULFILL THE TASKS THEY FACE.

13. WHAT I HAVE JUST SAID APPLIES WITH STILL GREATER FOUNDATION TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, INCLUDING TACTICAL ONES. IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT THE FIRE POWER OF SUCH WEAPONS IS EXCEPTIONALLY GREAT AND IN MODERN ARMIES NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAN HAVE A DECISIVE SIGNIFICANCE IN IMPLEMENTING THE TASKS FACING THE ARMED FORCES.

14. THUS IN ANALYSING THE COMBAT STRENGTH OF ARMED FORCES IT IS ESSENTIAL TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL ELEMENTS OF SUCH FORCES. IF THIS ASSESSMENT CAN BE APPLIED TO NATIONAL ARMED FORCES, THEN IT CAN ALL THE MORE BA APPLIED TO THE UNITED ARMED FORCES OF NATO AND OF THE WARSAW PACT IN CENTRAL EUROPE. AS IS WELL KNOWN, SUCH FORCES INCLUDE BOTH FOREIGN AND NATIONAL TROOPS, WHOSE STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION ARE NOT ALWAYS OF THE SAME KIND. THESE ARMED FORCES INCLUDE NOT ONLY GROUND FORCES BUT ALSO AIR FORCES AND UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THEREFORE IN COMPARING THE UNITED ARMED FORCES OF NATO AND

OF THE WARSAW PACT IT IS ESSENTIAL TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT  
ALL THEIR ELEMENTS AND ALL THEIR COMPONENT PARTS.

15. OVER A NUMBER OF YEARS RESPONSIBLE POLITICAL AND MILITARY  
FIGURES IN WESTERN COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THOSE COUNTRIES PARTICIPAT-  
ING IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS, HAVE OBSERVED THAT AN EQUILIBRIUM EXISTS  
IN THE AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE BETWEEN THE FORCES OF NATO  
AND OF THE WARSAW PACT WHICH ASSURES THE SECURITY OF EACH  
DISE IN AN ADEQUATE DEGREE.

16. AT A SESSION OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS  
OF THE US CONGRESS ON 27 JULY 1973 DEFENCE MINISTER SCHLESINGER  
OBSERVED: "THE SITUATION IN EUROPE NOW IS QUITE STABLE. WE  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 VIENNA 03027 02 OF 03 042127Z

WOULD LIKE TO KEEP IT THAT WAY." IN AN INTERVIEW GIVEN TO THE  
MAGAZINE TIME SCHLESINGER STATED IN JANUARY 1974 THAT NATO  
AND THE WARSAW PACT POSSESS "SOMETHING CLOSE TO NUMERICAL EQUALITY"  
AND THAT "WE WANT TO MAINTAIN THIS BALANCE OF FORCES  
IN EUROPE." SUCH STATEMENTS HAVE NOT ONLY BEEN MADE BY US  
OFFICIALS. SPEAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS CLUB AT THE  
END OF 1971, A. DOUGLAS-HOME, WHO HEADED THE BRITISH DEPARTMENT  
OF FOREIGN POLICY IN THE HEATH CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT, DECLARED  
THAT "THE REDUCTION OF THE NUMBERS OF FORCES SHOULD NOT DISTURB  
THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES." IN AN INTERVIEW GIVEN  
TO THE MAGAZINE SPIEGEL, THE FRG FOREIGN MINISTER W SCHEEL  
EMPHASISED (JULY 1973) THAT THE REDUCTION OF FORCES IN CENTRAL  
EUROPE "SHOULD NOT CHANGE THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES."

17. THIS SITUATION, WHICH IN THE VIEW OF LEADING FIGURES  
OF WESTERN STATES HAS FOR A LONG TIME ASSURED A CERTAIN STABILITY  
IN EUROPE, HAS COME INTO EXISTENCE HISTORICALLY. THE MEMBER  
COUNTRIES OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT HAVE CREATED THEIR ARMED  
FORCES AND HAVE DEVELOPED SOME OR OTHER ELEMENTS OF THESE  
FORCES TAKING INTO ACCOUNT A WHOLE RANGE OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC,  
HISTORICAL AND OTHER FACTORS.

18. IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT THE WESTERN STATES ARE CONTINUING  
INTENSIV  
E E E E E E E

ADP000  
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 VIENNA 03027 03 OF 03 042029Z

70  
ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 AEC-11 IO-14 OIC-04

OMB-01 DRC-01 /161 W

----- 088013

R 041851Z APR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2332

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 VIENNA 3027

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

HAVE PROJECTED A PROGRAMME FOR INCREASING THEIR MILITARY BUDGETS IN 1974 BY A FURTHER 2 BILLION DOLLARS IN ORDER TO "RAISE THE COMBAT CAPABILITY OF THEIR ARMED FORCES". IN THE LAST FEW YEARS ALONE THE NATO COUNTRIES HAVE INCREASED THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR AIR FORCES AND GROUND TROOPS BY TENS OF THOUSANDS OF MEN.

19. THE WESTERN PLAN FOR THE REDUCTION OF GROUND TROOPS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WHICH IS BASED ON THE ARTIFICIAL CONCEPT OF A DISPARITY IN SUCH TROOPS, CONTRADICTS A REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES. IN ADDITION IN THE CALCULATIONS OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER WHICH ARE BEING EMPLOYED BY WESTERN DELEGATES IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS SOME SUBSTANTIAL FACTORS ARE NOT TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. FOR EXAMPLE, THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS  
CONFIDENTIAL  
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 VIENNA 03027 03 OF 03 042029Z

INCLUDE AIR DEFENCE TROOPS IN THE TOTAL OF SOVIET GROUND TROOPS, BUT DO NOT INCLUDE SUCH TROOPS IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE FRG, GREAT BRITAIN, BELGIUM AND HOLLAND IN THE TOTAL OF NATO GROUND TROOPS. MOREOVER THE SIGNIFICANT QUANTITY OF CIVILIAN PERSONNEL EMPLOYED IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE NATO GROUPING IS NOT TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY WESTERN DELEGATIONS.

20. ATTEMPTS ARTIFICIALLY TO DETACH GROUND TROOPS FROM THE WHOLE AGGREGATE OF THE ARMED FORCES AND TO SPEAK OF THE REDUCTION OF GROUND TROOPS ALONE AND OF CHANGING THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS INCLUDED IN THESE TROOPS ARE AT VARIANCE WITH UNDERSTANDING OF THE FACT THAT THE ARMED FORCES OF THE

STATE OF NATO AND OF THE WARSAW PACT IN CENTRAL EUROPE SHOULD BE EXAMINED IN THEIR TOTALITY. THE INCLUSION OF GROUND TROOPS ALONE IN REDUCTIONS MEANS THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF THE FURTHER GROWTH OF AIR FORCES AND OF UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS IN FACT PRESERVED. IT IS EASY TO SEE THAT THE PRESERVATION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF INCREASING AIR FORCES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHICH ARE SO DANGEROUS UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS, DOES NOT CORRESPOND TO THE COMMON TASK OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH, AS WAS INDICATED IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF 28 JUNE 1973, CONSISTS OF ASSISTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MORE STABLE RELATIONS AND THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE.

21. BASING THEIR CASE ON THE CONCEPT OF FALSE DISPARITIES BETWEEN THE GROUND TROOPS OF NATO AND OF THE WARSAW PACT, THE WESTERN COUNTRIES HAVE PUT FORWARD A PROPOSAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMON CEILING FOR THESE TROOPS. DETACHING IN THIS WAY ONE ELEMENT OF THE GENERAL RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THEY WANT TO CHANGE THE WHOLE BALANCE AND THEREBY TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. IN FACT, THE VERY IDEA OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMON CEILINGS FOR GROUND TROOPS ALONE CONTRADICTS THE GENERALLY RECOGNISED PRINCIPLE OF ASSESSING THE MILITARY SITUATION TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL ELEMENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES, THE MORE ESPECIALLY SUCH MAIN STRIKE FORCES AS AIR FORCES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS. FROM THIS ONE CAN DRAW ONLY ONE CONCLUSION: THE WESTERN COUNTRIES ARE STRIVING FOR UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES, IGNORING THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. OUR CONVICTION OF THIS IS STRENGTHENED BY VIRUTE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCE THAT THE WESTERN

CONFIDENTIAL  
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 VIENNA 03027 03 OF 03 042029Z

STATES ARE PROPOSING TO LIMIT THE LEVELS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR AND THE USA ONLY, WHILE NO NATIONAL CEILINGS WOULD BE ESTABLISHED FOR THE TROOPS OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA, WHICH COMprise ABOUT 75 PERCENT OF ALL THE NATO ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

22. THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF THE NECESSITY OF CHANGING THE SO-CALLED DISPARITY IN THE GROUND FORCES OF THE TWO GROUPINGS TO THE ADVANTAGE OF NATO IS UNFOUNDED AND DOES NOT WITHSTAND CRITICISM. ITS AUTHORS ARE CLEARLY AVOIDING THE MAIN POINT, WHICH IS THAT IN ANALYSING THE GENERAL RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES ESPECIALLY WHEN IT IS A QUESTION OF AN INTENTION TO CHANGE IT, ONE MUST NOT LAY SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON ONLY ONE ELEMENT OF THIS BALANCE, AS THIS WILL LEAD TO THE INFILTRATION OF DAMAGE TO THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE OTHER SIDE. SUCH AN APPROACH CANNOT BE ACCEPTABLE, AS IT VIOLATES THE MAIN PRINCIPLE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS - THAT THE SECURITY OF ALL PARTIES MUST NOT BE DIMINISHED. END TEXT.

HUMES

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptoning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** NATIONAL SECURITY, NEGOTIATIONS, TROOP REDUCTIONS, FORCE & TROOP LEVELS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 04 APR 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** golinofr  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1974VIENNA03027  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D740076-0479  
**From:** VIENNA  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1974/newtext/t19740465/aaaachhk.tel  
**Line Count:** 437  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION ACDA  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 8  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** golinofr  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:** ANOMALY  
**Review Date:** 19 MAR 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <19 MAR 2002 by collinp0>; APPROVED <06 MAY 2002 by golinofr>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: BULGARIAN STATEMENT AT PLENARY ON APRIL 4, 1974  
**TAGS:** PARM, NATO, MBFR  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005